Haunted landscapes. Post-socialist memory limbo of contemporary Poland

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Post-communist landscapes are undergoing continuous process of transformations, more dynamically than many others types of cultural landscapes. One interpretation is followed by another reinterpretation; from the early festive anti-communist cleansings, thought discreet minor re-interpretations, infused by local and national political transformations, to contemporary ‘deep peeling’ or second wave of landscape purges. It looks like, contrary to the progressive van Gennep model of liminality, tradition oriented Polish society has been stacked up in a liminal limbo, unable or/and unwilling to go further and forget or assimilate the real or alleged communist landscapes. Since the 2016 election and the rise of populist-right powers, the Polish landscape has been haunted by the ghosts of communist past and it became clear that the past is still lives here now. New landscape modes of interpretations has been imposed and the spectre of communism, as Marx said almost 170 years, is still haunting over Central and Eastern Europe.

Key words: Cultural landscape. Memory. Hauntology. Post-socialism. Liminality. Poland.

Cultural landscape as representation system

Spatial character of culture is one of its major representative features. Cultural landscape can be seen as a result of culturalisation of space and/or spatialisation of culture. Since culture is principally based on meanings shared by a given group, or on similar modes of coding and decoding signs, cultural landscape becomes its visual exemplification. It is a unique spatial composition of tangible and intangible elements of distinct form, function and meaning. The landscape components are netted within a discursive relationships between societies, narratives, objects, memories, powers and believes. Landscape is a system of signs and relations, written in many layers, including aesthetic, political, ethic, economic, infrastructural, legal and many others.¹ Meanings are coded into buildings, monuments, trees, hills, urban structures, cities, shrines, but also into street names, narrations and rituals. Cultural landscape is an active transmitter of culture, a picture consisting of symbols rather than of facts.² Landscapes are expressions of believes, hopes and fears, experiences and hierarchical values of each group of society. The context is central to the understanding of the landscape, as it frames and embodies economic, social and cultural processes.

Landscape, in a similar way to language, can operate as a representational system. Landscape is one of the most visible and ‘communicative’ media, through which thoughts, ideas and feelings as well as powers and social constructions are represented within a culture. Representations through landscapes are therefore central to the process. The representational function of landscape is based on creation and interpretation of symbols and signs, which play a similar role as words in a language

representation system. The landscape idea represents a way of seeing in which people have 'represented to themselves and to others the world about them and their relationship with it, and through which they have commented on social relations'. This force, more abstract than material, is based on identity and symbolic links. Through their iconography, groups share the same representations, the same visions of the world and values, uniting them within the common space of belief. Iconography creates stable identities and helps to maintain these identities by resisting generalised circulation and partitioning space.

Urban cultural landscape can be perceived as the visual scheme illustrating the relationship of power and control from which it has emerged. The core meaning of a landscape is coded through symbols written into the setting. The meaning becomes more visible when contested or transformed. City scenery reflects powers, needs and aspirations as well as glorious and tragic history, all of which are written into the symbols and signs. The urban landscape projects and communicates the view of the dominant element of society to the remainder of the population, through the symbols scripted into the setting. Symbolic images are turned into solid rock / brick / concrete / steel features, while cultural icons become landscape icons through the process of conceptualising and signifying the world. Socially produced and constructed cultural landscape, as much as any other political statement, can be seen as 'centres of human meaning as well as mode of social control and repression'. Mechanisms of restrain are usually rooted in the past, while interpretation of the past frequently is political assignment.

Cultural landscape and its physical and immaterial components changes: form or materiality changes seldom; function or use changes sometimes; significance or meanings has been frequently changed in a process of re-interpretation and reconstruction. Urban landscape is also often interpreted as a palimpsest, the multi-layered tests, where an older narrative is covered by a different one. Sometimes, especially during the fundamental transformations, the urban parchment is heated to reveal the older texts, while the newer texts disappear or become irrelevant for the time being.

**Memories and the haunted past**

Past or so called ‘history’ can be only seen throughout its narratives or interpretations. It is just impossible to recall all the past facts, people, activities, objects, and it remains undoubtedly impossible, even with the help of most advanced technologies, to recollect past relations between them. Past always passes, and we are left with a set of its interpretations, stories and memories. Each social group has constructed its cultural memories out of specific tracks of remembrance, oblivion and narratives, which are believabilia rather than actual memorabilia. Facts and events

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5  ZUKIN, S. Landscapes of Power... 338 p.
that we remember, recall and believe develop into meaning and significance of cultural features. Every memory we try to reproduce becomes – as Terdiman\(^8\) states – a 'present past'. It has been usual for one historical dictatorships of memories / narratives.

Memory and memorising policy is the way of representation of the past, and often becomes important political resource. Memory can be also, as says Foucault,\(^9\) an important factor of social negotiations: 'if one controls people's memories, one controls their dynamism. (...) It is vital to have the position of this memory, to control it, administer it, tell it what it must contain'.\(^10\) Power, control, history and memory become core foci of struggle over past and historical policies. Commemoration as well as oblivion is a part of historical policy, which finds its materialising form in cultural landscape features.\(^11\) Memory can be turned into official, legalised and petrified 'history'. Strong narration might dominate over any other possible interpretations of the past. Those single meta-narrations, the only legal interpretations of the past are typical for dictatorial systems, while democracy allows heterotopic memories, varied from group to group. When considering the production of personal, collective, cultural and social memory we need to see 'a complex process of cultural production and consumption that acknowledges the persistence of cultural traditions as well as the ingenuity of memory makers and the subversive interests of memory consumers'.\(^12\)

Political control over memories is systematised, institutionalised and facilitated by numerous institutions, establish to explain, interpret and disseminate real/prefferred/factual/ chosen or favoured history. From university to publishers, school book commissions and ministries of education, film producers and news agencies, to national remembrance institutes, like the Polish Institute of National Remembrance.\(^13\) Officially approved memories sometimes, particularly in totalitarian states, become a law and 'legitimate truth', multiplied and propagated by media and other institutions.

Memory is being 'archivasied' not only in national archives, and in people's minds, what can be very changeable and unstable, but also in written forms, as well as in material artefacts, like landscape. Memory never mirrors the past, since it has always been transmuted by our self, mind, believes and subjectivities, implied by its human character, visible in selective process of recalling. The process of selection of memories is condition or determined by several factors, most of which related to the past. The result of recalls and remembering is visualised and infixed in material and mental features of cultural landscape.\(^14\) Both burdens and glories of history have their landscape representations, and can be read, if only find its decoder and reader. Materialised and institutionalised features of memories become authorised elements of memorial policy, sometimes, especially in authoritarian regimes, aimed to abusively control memory. 'Cultural memory exists in two modes: first in the mode of potentiality

\(^13\) CZEPCZYŃSKI, M. Cultural Landscape..., 209 p.
of the archives whose accumulated texts, images, and rules of the conduct act as a total horizon, and second in the mode of actuality, whereby each contemporary context puts the objectivised meaning into its own perspective, giving its own relevance'.

Memory is a phenomenon that is directly related to the present; our perception of the past is always influenced by the present, which means that it is always changing.

Cultural memory is seldom a coherent, homogenous and unitary symbolic narration. It has rather a heterogeneous mosaic structure, and some of its component and texts spread with different speed and directions via different media.

History and heritage – that what we opt to select from the past – are used everywhere to shape emblematic place identities and support particular political ideologies. What to keep and what not to keep is an indicator of variable and unfixed human ambitions, desires and aspirations. Cultural and political history of the nation, society and city has been constantly negotiated and materialized on physical surrounding as an identity, based on what is remembered or rather recalled. The process of reinterpretation of memories is most clearly visible in transitional societies, where political, economic and cultural factors enhance re-definitions of the past. Cultural memory is always based on social compromise on things to be remembered and things to be forgotten. National and local society can be understood as a community connected by memories and obliviousness. ‘Any cultural memory, and especially national memory is a summary of scleroses of all the citizens. Both real scleroses, coming with the age, and mental scleroses; various disavowals, cognitive dissonances, sometimes shames, mostly fears’.

Memory has never been a stable fact or structure: it always relates to expectations, conditions, dreams and uncertainties of the reminiscent. Past facts, events, people, places are being evoked enhanced, celebrated, interpreted. Memory is a process in which the presence is haunted by images, representations or just ghosts from the past. This creates the state of temporal and historical disjunction, when the ghost as that which is neither present, nor absent, neither dead nor alive. ‘Ghosts arrive from the past and appear in the present. However, the ghost cannot be properly said to belong to the past’. ‘Hauntology’ refers to the problematic, intangible and paradoxical ontology that ghosts or spectres of the past, in their incessant haunting, pose for discourse on history. ‘The key to hauntology is unclear memory, fractal, mutated and deformed by the pressure of following layers of incoming information’. The concept has its roots

in Derrida’s discussion of Marx’s proclamation that ‘a spectre is haunting Europe — the spectre of communism’.24 ‘Hauntological spectres come to bother us from any zone of deficit lying between things as they were / are / will be and things as they are thought or hoped to be in the future. The first layer (‘the past’) can only be seen through the medium of the second layer (‘the present’) so that we can’t be entirely sure of the image portrayed by the first layer. This process of obfuscation is a metaphor for memory – or more specifically an allegory of memory – and more broadly an allegory of any sort of representation of the world or any inadequately (‘untruthfully’) symbolic or imaginary conceptualisation. The hauntological layer shows the first layer to be ‘untrue’ and hints at some unresolved lack in this truth.’

Liminal landscape rites of passage

The power written into the visible forms of urban structures is featured most evidently in totalitarian regimes. In consequence, the landscape – memory discourse becomes more noteworthy in transitional societies, when a changing political and social system implies changing reminiscences and recollections of the past. Re-interpretations of the past is usually a natural process, following gradual cultural and generation shifts. It habitually takes a form of cultural-historical evolution. In some circumstances, however, cultural memory is re-interpreted in a more revolutionary manner as a crossing of cultural borders or limes, a liminal act that is accompanied by ambiguity, openness, and indeterminacy.26 In this period of transition our normal limits to thought, self-understanding, and behaviour are relaxed, opening the way to something new, one’s sense of identity dissolves, bringing about disorientation. It is a limbo, an ambiguous period characterised by humility, seclusion, tests, and haziness. Arnold van Gennep’s27 threefold structure of rites of passage includes a pre-liminal phase (separation), based on sorting out the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’; defining and new coding begin an epistemological transformation, with cultural cleansing also a part of this phase. The second is a liminal phase (transition) characterised by a ménage of meanings and representations; the old is re-interpreted and de-contextualised, while the new is constructed, both physically and mentally. Then comes the final post-liminal phase (reincorporation), when the division between ‘old’ and ‘new’ becomes insignificant and eventually disappears, the ‘old’ merging and becoming assimilated into contemporary social, cultural and economic life.28

Cultural landscape always represents social, economic, political and cultural trends, sometimes hidden under a layer of declarations and practices. The liminal transition usually is ended by the final incorporation, but sometimes people, signs, places or objects may not complete a transition, or a transition between two states may not be fully possible. Those who remain in between two states may become liminal on a permanent or long-term basis. Such liminal times can accompanied and constructed

26 CZEPCZYŃSKI, M. Cultural Landscape..., 209 p.
by liminal landscapes: landscapes no longer typical for the previous regime, but at the same time quite different from the aspired ones. The liminal transformation of Polish cultural landscape consists of multiple separations, transitions and re-incorporations, expressed by political statements, everyday practices and living spaces. The burdensome meaning of communism was usually left deeply coded into both the external and internal structure of urban landscapes. The problem of dealing with the meanings and forms of the post-socialist leftovers has been one of the most significant issues of post-socialist landscape management. The 1989 ‘autumn of nations’ brought not only an overturn of the communist dictatorships, but also the opportunity of finding new paths towards the future.

Post-communist landscapes have been washed away, and unwelcome elements and qualities had to disaster to make urban spaces more habitable and acceptable for the liberalised societies. Polish post-communist memory and landscape transformations can be somehow paralleled to liminal passages:

- The first pursuit included most obvious, relatively easy and popularly agreed cleansings and changes of the most vivid communist iconic landscapes, generally ended by the late 1990s. Many of the unwanted codes and symbols, names and labels had been eliminated by physical destruction and demolishing of features hard to reinterpret, followed by elimination from social practices and memories. Removal, renaming, rededication or just reuse of the symbolic heritage of a discredited regime was, in itself, simple enough, ‘a new onomatology of places’.

- The second post-communist liminal phase of cultural landscape transformation was characterised by uncertainty and hesitations, instable codes and initial ambiguous period of seclusions, tests, and haziness, was focused on a second degree of icons, which often lost its political connotations.

- The early incorporations and reinterpretations, have been introduced since the early 2000s, when some of the former communist icons become part of popular culture, sometimes jokes, sometimes historical monuments, amalgamated into local heritage, city branding and significance system.

- The fourth passage turns the liminal transformation back again to the initial stage and contradicts the van Gennep’s transformation process. Since the last parliament and presidential elections in Poland in 2015 and absolute win of the right-populist Law and Justice party, the landscape and memory policy transformation had been returned to separation, but on much deeper and often angrier level, whirling the society into the memory limbo helix.

For the last 27 years it seemed that significant part of the post-socialist societies would have rather been ‘put history aside’ and not evoke most painful memories. What seemed to be a linear process, now it looks like a circular or liminal spiral, when old memories are being contested and obeyed, new memories and heritages are being contributed, history is being corrected to meet the expectations and goals of the

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29 CZĘPECZYŃSKI, M. Cultural Landscape..., 209 p.
ruling party. The memory whirl pulls people, places, memories, narratives inside this long-term limbo of liminality.

Renewed interpretations of the recent past
Societies have always been diverse, variable, and often mutable structures, represented by social actions. Investigation of the consequences of types of social action and a study of how these types of action come into conflict and create tensions for specific individuals have been at the heart of Weber’s sociology. Men may engage in four basic types of social actions, including purposeful or goal oriented rational action, which entails a complicated plurality of means and ends; value-oriented, when individuals use rational – that is effective – means to achieve goals or ends that are defined in terms of subjective meaning; emotional or affective motivations, fuses means and ends together so that action becomes emotional and impulsive; and traditional action, when the ends and the means of action are fixed by custom and tradition.

Contemporary social and cultural transformations are closely interrelated to change of dominating social actions, not only in Poland, but also in many other countries across Europe and the world. New wave of political radicalism facilitate the post-post-modern societies, where history, memory and heritage play an unexceptional role in society and nation making. The purposeful, heterogeneous future-oriented actions, typical for neoliberal societies, seems to be replaced by more affective and impulsive actions, frequently referred as traditional or past-oriented social actions. The change brings new level of domination of the imagined, better past, or rather its idealised or demonised representations. It seems that ‘the past is never dead. It’s not even past’. Cultural memory is always directly related to the present hopes, fears and expectations; our perception of the past is always influenced by present conditions or social actions. ‘Reality takes shape only in memory’, and memory is shaped by contemporary visions and believes.

The 2015 political shift in Poland was almost immediately followed by new memory and heritage landscape policies. High social expectations of better, but also more satisfied, prouder life brought revival of national and nationalistic aspects of history. Many memories and facts have been sent to oblivion or labelled as ‘fakes’. Special attention was focused on hunt for real or, in most cases, alleged aspects of communism. Communism, together with liberalism or cosmopolitanism became one of the major imaginative enemy of the new powers. The ‘death’ of communism after the fall of the Soviet Union, in particular after theorists such as Francis Fukuyama asserted that capitalism had conclusively triumphed over other political-economic systems and reached the ‘end of history’. But if communism was always spectral, as Marx and Engels

stated and what does it mean to say it is now dead? Many, especially emotional and traditional oriented political leaders in Poland, seem to fully agree with the believe that communism is still alive. Since the spectre of communism is still there, there is an urgent and vital need for unremitting separations of good and bad, reinterpretations and over-interpretations. Any sign, object or text suspected to be ‘non-patriotic’, non-traditional or, even worse, related to communism, might be sentence to oblivion by displacement and annihilation.

This cultural turn is being supported and facilitated by numerous governments institutions, led by the conspicuous Institute of National Remembrance (INR). Fast legal changes allowed new board and management of the institution to choose and approve memories, creates a legitimate truth, multiplied and propagated by media and other related institutions. New memories and heritages are being constructed by a team of heritage signifiers and the heritageneers – engineers of heritage. Affective and tradition orientated social actions are implemented by numerus narratives, media and activities. Ministry of Culture and National Heritage is another institution to enhance the heritage change. The current minister is also one of three deputy prime ministers, what only emphasizes the importance of heritage. The Ministry’s activities are often focused on creation of new historical policies, emphasising the heroic martyrdom of the Poles. The attempts to reconstruct, rename and reinterpret the Gdańsk based Second World War Museum into Polish 1939 War Museum is one of the recent examples of new history policy.

The museum changes are implemented by new, more strict memorial policies. Soviet Army and alleged communists’ monuments became one of the first targets of the change, often with a significant bottom-up initiatives. Institute for National Remembrance has urged regional authorities to take down 500 Soviet monuments. The president of the INR, Lukasz Kaminski, has announced that state historians are setting up an ‘inventory of places where there are still Soviet monuments’. In June 2016 campaign begun to urge local governments to liquidate Soviet monuments, even before a relevant law is created. There is little nostalgia for the years that Poland spent as a satellite state to the Soviet Union, but initiatives to take down Soviet monuments in the past have sparked an overwhelmingly negative reaction from Russia. After the removal of the monument to Red Army General Ivan Chernyakhovsky in September in the town of Pieniężno, Russia threatened Poland with ‘most serious consequences’. Russian Ambassador to Poland Sergiej Andreyev accused the country of ‘historic denial’, arguing that if it were not for the Red Army’s effort in World War II, Poland would have never survived as a country. Only a few months earlier, authorities in the Polish town of Nowa Sól demolished a memorial to the brotherhood-in-arms of Polish and Red Army soldiers. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded with a statement saying, ‘mockery of our memorial sites in Poland has been built into the state policy’.

Names’ changing is another example of liminal cultural landscape separation. Thousands of place names had been changed in the early 1990s in Poland, but, according to the officials there are ca. 1,500 streets and squares in Poland, which names are

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associated with the communist era. The nationalist right dominated parliament prepared an act of law to delegalize the ‘bad’ urban toponomastic. According to the proposed project, ‘names of buildings, objects and public infrastructure, including roads, bridges and streets cannot commemorate people, organizations, events or dates symbolising communism or any other totalitarian system’. Memories can be also evoked or steered by leisure and games, especially among the younger citizens. In 2015 a board game modelled on Monopoly was launched, as an initiative of the INR, that shows the difficulties of the Communist-era economy. The INR-designed game has been a bestseller in Poland and elsewhere. But Russia banned the game earlier this month after it failed to convince the creators to remove all historical references to Communism and turn it into a board game about shopping. The anti-communist narrative is also, among xenophobic and homophobic slogans, dominating many of football matches, marches and manifestations, where stadium hooligans are merged with the nationalistic quasi-militia, and together incorporate tradition dominated social actions.

For a zealot believer, the spectre of communism can be found practically everywhere, in every aspect of social and civic activities, landscape features or person. Even the anti-communist icon, the former leader of the Solidarity trade union, Lech Wałęsa, is being accused and then often labelled as ‘a communist’, similarly to dozens other veterans of anti-communism movement. The local leader of Law and Justice in Gdańsk Region – Andrzej Jaworski – called for a local referendum to change the name of the country’s third largest Gdańsk Lech Wałęsa Airport. Wałęsa, according to Jaworski and many activists of Law and Justice, was undoubtedly a communist agent, unworthy to be honoured by the name of the airport. In the name of ‘historical truth’ the new, state propaganda machine tries to eliminate and/or reinterpret the ‘unrightfully’ eminent protagonists from public memory and history. Official photographic exhibition, which accompanied the 2016 Warsaw NATO summit did not show any of the leader, who actually signed the accession agreement in 1999. The mighty ring wing party tries to change schoolbooks and teaching programs, to re-write the history, according to tradition oriented narrations.

Conclusions
Cultural landscapes, as mélange of forms, meanings and functions, project and represent the powers, needs and values of a given society. Memory, as the representation of the past, is an important political resource, and sometimes, especially in tradition-oriented societies, memory becomes a major source of power. The past manifested in memorial practises of commemoration and rejection influences contemporary identities and, to a further extend, future opportunities and
developments. Renan\textsuperscript{46} emphasised the significance of forgetfulness, and historical error, as essential in the creation of a nation or cultural group. Historical research, by revealing unwanted truths, can even endanger nationhood. The essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things. Our daily encounters with forgetting have not taught us enough about how much power it exercises over our lives, what reflections and feelings it evokes in different individuals, how even art and science presuppose – with sympathy or antipathy – forgetting, and finally what political and cultural barriers can be erected against forgetting when it cannot be reconciled with what is right and moral. If we try to acquire a better understanding of all these aspects of forgetting, to form a more discriminating attitude toward them in our own lives, we find that cultural history provides a helpful perspective in which the value of the art of forgetting emerges, along with the value of a simultaneous, indispensable critique of forgetting.\textsuperscript{47} Society which lives in the specific dictatorship of the past and painful memories become specific form of a public cult, incessantly creates new wrongs and is decrees to stagnation. Pathetic reference to own sufferings and comfortable obliviousness of sufferings rendered to somebody else complete together rather well. Not only terror of obliviousness, but also terror of memory is used to achieve temporary social, political or economic goals.\textsuperscript{48}

In contrary to Francis Fukuyama thesis on 'The End of History and the Last Man',\textsuperscript{49} it looks like Poland face now a specific 'The Revenge of History: The Battle for the Twenty-First Century'.\textsuperscript{50} New wave of political radicalism seems to facilitate the post-post-modern times and societies, where history, memory and heritage seems to play an unexceptional role in the nation making. Bauman\textsuperscript{51} writes of uncertainties and fears being more diffuse and harder to pin down. Indeed, they are, to use the title of one of his books, 'liquid fears', which are amorphous and have no easily identifiable referent.\textsuperscript{52} And the fear of the past are always better know or remembered. There are obviously many spectres flying over Europe; for some it is the spectre of neoliberalism, for other communism, while many see the clear spectre of nationalism and xenophobia. The unclear 'liquid fears' materialise relatively easily within a historical discourse, much more difficult to be verified, appealed to contemporary qualms and believeabilia.\textsuperscript{53} Through political memory lenses historical spectres become detectable. The spectre of communism, especially in a country deeply stigmatised by the system, can be turned form ‘liquid’ to concrete and solid, visible in cultural landscape. The landscape hunt goes on, for haunting spectres and memories. Power over historical memory is a substantial instrument of contemporary policy, used to legitimate present and future actions. George Orwell in his novel ‘Nineteen Eighty Four’\textsuperscript{54} points out that he who controls the past commands the future; he who commands the future controls the past. Past,

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present and future are interwoven into each other, and represented in landscape forms, facilitated by landscape functions, and signified by its changeable meanings.

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